UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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DAVID J. CASH, :

Plaintiff, : 09 Civ. 1922 (BSJ) (HBP)

-against- : REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION¹

BERNSTEIN, MD, :

Defendant. :

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PITMAN, United States Magistrate Judge:

TO THE HONORABLE BARBARA S. JONES, United States District Judge,

I. <u>Introduction</u>

By notice of motion dated March 4, 2010 (Docket Item 11), defendant moves pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) to revoke plaintiff's <u>in forma pauperis</u> ("IFP") status on the ground that plaintiff has previously had at least three Section 1983 actions

¹At the time the action was originally filed, the Honorable Leonard B. Sand, United States District Judge, granted plaintiff's application for in forma pauperis status based on plaintiff's ex parte submission (Docket Item 1). Although the present application seeking to revoke plaintiff's in forma pauperis status is non-dispositive, I address it by way of a report and recommendation to eliminate any appearance of a conflict between the decision of a district judge and that of a magistrate judge.

dismissed as frivolous, malicious or failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and has not shown that he is in imminent danger of serious physical injury. Defendant further seeks an order directing that the action be dismissed unless plaintiff pays the full filing fee within thirty (30) days. For the reasons set forth below, I respectfully recommend that defendant's motion be granted.

II. Facts

Plaintiff, a sentenced inmate in the custody of the New York State Department of Correctional Services, commenced this action on or about January 12, 2009 by submitting his complaint to the Court's Pro Se office. Plaintiff alleges, in pertinent part, that he has "a non-healing ulcer that is gane green [sic]" and that defendant Bernstein "did not want to treat the ulcer right" (Complaint, dated March 3, 3009 (Docket Item 2) ("Compl."), at 3).

The action was originally commenced against two defendants -- Dr. Bernstein and Dr. Finkelstein. The action was dismissed as to Dr. Finkelstein because the complaint contained no allegations whatsoever concerning Dr. Finkelstein (Order dated February 18, 2010 (Docket Item 9)).

On March 4, 2010, the sole remaining defendant -- Dr.

Bernstein -- filed the current motion. Plaintiff failed to

submit a response. Accordingly, on August 20, 2010, I issued an

Order advising plaintiff that if he wished to oppose the motion,

he must submit his opposition by September 15, 2010 and that

after that date I would consider the motion fully submitted and

ripe for decision (Order dated August 20, 2010 (Docket Item 15)).

The only submission plaintiff has made in response to my Order is

a multi-part form issued by the New York State Department of

Correctional Services entitled "Disbursement or Refund Request."

By this form, plaintiff appears to request that the New York

State Department of Correctional Services pay the filing fee for

this action. The form is marked "Denied."

III. Analysis

28 U.S.C. § 1915 permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in a federal court without prepayment of the filing fee that would ordinarily be charged. Although an indigent, incarcerated individual need not prepay the filing fee at the time at the time of filing, he must subsequently pay the fee,

²Plaintiff sent this form directly to my chambers, and it has not been docketed by the Clerk of the Court. The form will be docketed at the time this Report and Recommendation is issued.

to the extent he is able to do so, through periodic withdrawals from his inmate accounts. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b); Harris v. City of New York, 607 F.3d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 2010). To prevent abuse of the judicial system by inmates, paragraph (g) of this provision denies incarcerated individuals the right to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee if they have repeatedly filed meritless actions, unless such an individual shows that he or she is in imminent danger of serious physical injury. See Ortiz v. McBride, 380 F.3d 649, 658 (2d Cir. 2004) ("[T]he purpose of the PLRA . . . was plainly to curtail what Congress perceived to be inmate abuses of the judicial process."); Nicholas v. Tucker, 114 F.3d 17, 19 (2d Cir. 1997). Specifically, paragraph (g) provides:

In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.

28 U.S.C. § 1915 (g).

If an inmate plaintiff seeks to avoid prepayment of the filing fee by alleging imminent danger of serious physical injury, there must be a nexus between the serious physical injury

asserted and the claims alleged. <u>Pettus v. Morgenthau</u>, 554 F.3d 293, 298 (2d Cir. 2009).

Section 1915(g) clearly prevents plaintiff from proceeding in this action without prepayment of the filing fee. The memorandum submitted by defendant establishes that plaintiff has had his IFP status revoked on at least four prior occasions as a result of his repeatedly filing meritless actions.

• In 2005, plaintiff commenced an action in the

United States District Court for the Northern District

of New York seeking to have his infected leg amputated.

Nelson³ v. Lee, No. 9:05-CV-1096 (NAM) (DEP), 2007 WL

4333776 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2007). In that matter, the

³It appears that plaintiff uses the names David J. Cash and Dennis Nelson interchangeably. In his complaint in this matter, plaintiff states that the Departmental Identification Number, or DIN, assigned to him by the New York State Department of Correctional Services ("DOCS") is 94-B-0694 (Compl. at 7) . DOCS inmate account records submitted by plaintiff in connection with his application for IFP status indicate that DIN 94-B-0694 is assigned to Dennis Nelson. In addition, the DOCS form described in footnote two bears the docket number of this action, but is signed in the name of Dennis Nelson and was sent in an envelope identifying the sender as Dennis Nelson. A subsequent action has been filed in this Court in which the plaintiff identifies himself as Dennis Nelson but lists his DIN as 94-B-0694, the same DIN used by plaintiff here. Finally, plaintiff has submitted nothing to controvert the assertion in defendant's papers that David Cash and Dennis Nelson are the same person. In light of all these facts, I conclude that David Cash and Dennis Nelson are both names used by plaintiff.

Honorable Norman A. Mordue, Chief United States District Judge, accepted and adopted the Report and Recommendation of the Honorable David E. Peebles, United States Magistrate Judge, that plaintiff had brought three or more prior actions that had been dismissed for failure to state a claim and that plaintiff's IFP status should, therefore, be revoked. 2007 WL 4333776 at *1-*2.

- In Nelson v. Nesmith, No. 9:06-CV-1177 (TJM) (DEP),

 2008 WL 3836387 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2008), plaintiff

 again filed an action concerning the medical care he

 was receiving for his left leg. The Honorable Thomas

 J. McAvoy, United States District Judge, accepted the

 Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Peebles,

 and revoked plaintiff's IFP status and dismissed the

 action on the ground that plaintiff had previously

 commenced at least three actions that had been dis
 missed on the merits. 2008 WL 3836387 at *1, *7.
- In Nelson v. Spitzer, No. 9:07-CV-1241 (TJM) (RFT), 2008 WL 268215 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2008), Judge McAvoy again revoked plaintiff's IFP status on the ground that plaintiff had commenced three or more actions that

constituted "strikes" under Section 1915(g) and had not shown an imminent threat of serious physical injury. 2008 WL 268215 at *1-*2.

Finally, in Nelson v. Chang, No. 08-CV-1261

(KAM) (LB), 2009 WL 367576 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2009), the Honorable Kiyo A. Matsumoto, United States District Judge, also found, based on the cases discussed above, that plaintiff had exhausted the three strikes permitted by Section 1915(g) and could not proceed IFP in the absence of a demonstration of an imminent threat of serious physical injury. 2009 WL 367576 at *2-*3.

As defendant candidly admits, there is one case in which plaintiff's leg infection was found to support a finding of an imminent threat of serious physical injury sufficient to come within the exception to Section 1915(g). Nelson v. Scoggy, No. 9:06-CV-1146 (NAM) (DRH), 2008 WL 4401874 at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2008). Nevertheless, summary judgment was subsequently granted for defendants in that case, and the complaint was dismissed. Judge Mordue concluded that there was no genuine issue of fact that plaintiff had received adequate medical care for his leg wound and that the failure of the leg to heal was the result of plaintiff's own acts of self-mutilation and interfer-

ence with the treatment provided. <u>Nelson v. Scoggy</u>, No. 9:06-CV-1146 (NAM) (DRH), 2009 WL 5216955 at *3-*4 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2009).

In light of the foregoing, there can be no reasonable dispute that plaintiff has exceeded the three "strikes" allowed by Section 1915(g) and that he cannot, therefore, proceed here without prepaying the filing fee unless he demonstrates an imminent threat of serious physical injury. Plaintiff has declined to attempt to make this showing in response to defendant's motion, and the only suggestion in the record of serious physical injury is the bare statement in the complaint that plaintiff "need[s] to go back to a wound speci[a]list before the gane green [sic] kills [him]" (Compl. at 5). "However, unsupported, vague, self-serving, conclusory speculation is not sufficient to show that Plaintiff is, in fact, in imminent danger of serious physical harm." Merriweather v. Reynolds, 586 F. Supp. 2d 548, 552 (D.S.C. 2008), citing Ciarpaglini v. Saini, 352 F.3d 328, 330 (7th Cir. 2003) and White v. Colorado, 157 F.3d 1226, 1231-32 (10th Cir. 1998); see also Martin v. Shelton, 319

 $^{^4}$ Although the form complaint utilized by plaintiff expressly asks about prior actions involving the same facts, plaintiff disclosed only the <u>Scoggy</u> action and expressly denied the existence of any other actions relating to his imprisonment (Compl. at 6).

F.3d 1048, 1050 (8th Cir. 2003) (imminent danger exception to Section 1915(g) requires "specific fact allegations of ongoing serious physical injury, or of a pattern of misconduct evidencing the likelihood of imminent serious physical injury"). Given the plaintiff's history, as set forth in the cases described above, I conclude that this vague statement is insufficient to support a finding that plaintiff is in imminent danger of serious physical injury.⁵

Furthermore, to the extent that Nelson's medical treatment was delayed, much of the delay was due to his own refusal to cooperate with medical staff and his self-mutilations. Nelson's actions to thwart the medical treatment of his wound cannot be construed as interference or indifference by anyone else . . . [T]he medical treatment Nelson received complied with constitutional guarantees as it was appropriate, timely, and delayed only by Nelson's own actions.

Nelson v. Scoggy, supra, 2009 WL 5216955 at *4.

Given plaintiff's total failure to respond to the pending motion and his failure to even deny that he is actively thwarting treatment of his wound, it would be sheer speculation for me to conclude that he is in imminent danger of a serious injury as a result of defendant's conduct.

⁵Plaintiff has sent me several letters describing his wound and its symptoms in detail, and I have no doubt that the wound is serious. However, in granting summary judgment dismissing an action last year based on the same allegations, Judge Mordue of the Northern District found that there was no genuine issue of fact that plaintiff's own conduct was responsible for the ineffectiveness of the treatment he was provided:

IV. Conclusion

Accordingly, for all the foregoing reasons, I find that plaintiff has had three or more prior actions dismissed as being frivolous, malicious or failing to state a claim and that plaintiff's in forma pauperis status should, therfore, be revoked. If your Honor accepts this recommendation, I further recommend that the action be dismissed unless plaintiff pays the filing fee in full within thirty (30) days of your Honor's final resolution of this motion.

V. OBJECTIONS

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from receipt of this Report to file written objections. See also Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a). Such objections (and responses thereto) shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court, with courtesy copies delivered to the Chambers of the Honorable Barbara S. Jones, United States District Judge, 500 Pearl Street, Room 1920, and to the Chambers of the undersigned, 500 Pearl Street, Room 750, New York, New York 10007. Any requests for an extension of time for filing objections must be directed to Judge Jones. FAILURE TO OBJECT WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS WILL RESULT

IN A WAIVER OF OBJECTIONS AND WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW.

Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 155 (1985); United States v. Male

Juvenile, 121 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 1997); IUE AFL-CIO Pension

Fund v. Herrmann, 9 F.3d 1049, 1054 (2d Cir. 1993); Frank v.

Johnson, 968 F.2d 298, 300 (2d Cir. 1992); Wesolek v. Canadair

Ltd., 838 F.2d 55, 57-59 (2d Cir. 1988); McCarthy v. Manson, 714

F.2d 234, 237-38 (2d Cir. 1983).

Dated: New York, New York October 25, 2010

Respectfully submitted,

HENRY PITMÁN

United States Magistrate Judge

Copies mailed to:

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